PARSEC Technical Information

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== Introduction ==

Primary operating system vendors are in business to make money. That doesn't
always put customer concerns like system longevity in focus. Vendors often
want to deprecate their operating system before their customer base is ready
to upgrade. They are incentivized to do this in order to create an upgrade
and thus revenue cycle that their investors can predict. 

However, from a customer perspective there are many situations in which the
client would like to version-lock an environment and leave it alone. This
might sound silly initially, but consider a few examples. What if a client
has a multi-million dollar manufacturing operation and the computer system
was just one part of it. Any significant changes introduce severe risk in
the environment and could even impact production. However, even in such an
environment, one might have a regulatory requirement to keep systems
patched. 

===== What Exactly is a Patch? =====

It might seem silly, but not everyone agrees on what constitutes a patch.
There are various parts of the operating system landscape to update, and not
all of them go into mainstream patches. Let's breakdown the difference
between an operating system patch affecting a user-space program, the
kernel, or a bit of hardware. 

===== Stability versus Security Patches =====

Some, but not all vendors will bifurcate their patches into two categories:
security and stability. A stability patch would typically fix an issue
discovered by users or their own lab-techs. 

An example of this would be a patch addressing a system crash under specific
conditions.  Another would be a patch fixing a severe performance issue that
only happens when the system is under load.  These type of patches might
impact the functionality or usability of the system but do not impact the
security posture of the system. They fix problems.

Security patches are typically only used to address security issues which
are found after the initial release of the operating system.  These are the
most critical patches to apply when put under any type of regulatory
framework.  Why?  Because you could fail an audit, otherwise.  This is
(usually) a bigger deal than an instability bug that you may or may not be
running into.

===== Are These Original OEM Patches? =====

Never. No way. We are not legally able to do this and we can only touch vendor patches when the customer has clear entitlements with the vendor. At that point, we are just consultants who do your OEM patching for you, but you've paid for the original entitlement. We absolutely will never download a patch from a vendor and "cheat" by putting it on a customer system. It's immoral and illegal. 

We **only** deliver patches which we've developed in-house with our own independent methods.

===== How Does One Pay for Patch Entitlements? =====

Customers pay hourly consulting fees to pay for the hotfix or patch they want/need. The rate is determined by talking to your salesperson. 

We can also make recommendations for any patches based on outstanding CVE reports and quote you on those patches only so you can present that as a regulatory audit artifact showing that your system is still secure and up to date on patches specifically for security issues. 
===== What is a Firmware Update? =====

Some hardware devices need their own internal code to function. Think of it
as a mini-operating-system just for that special device. This is called
firmware. It's a grey-area between hardware and software, but it's
definitely more soft. It often lives on an NVRAM storage for the device. 

You typically find firmware needed for devices like SCSI HBAs, Fibre Channel
HBAs, network interfaces, and of course motherboards also have their own
firmware which folks will call a "BIOS" or newer systems with EFI (extended
firmware interface). 

Firmware images are much different than OS patches.  They don't really touch
the operating system at all.  They only install on the specific devices they
are used for.

Most of the time, vendors either do not package up firmware updates, or they
do so by relying on the external vendor to provide some kind of tools and
firmware images.  In many cases, one can find the OEM's firmware and simply
apply it.  For older Sun systems, this is often the case.  However, for many
IBM POWER systems, there are some cases where one can only use the firmware
updates that IBM packages.

Firmware is definitely not something that PARSEC can be in the business of
patching.  Where possible and completely legal, we can package any firmware
updates that come from the hardware OEM which are documented to be legally allowed for distribution.  They can be embedded in the same package format we use (EPM - Enterprise Package Manager).  This is the same thing
the big vendors do.  They just *stop* doing it after the OS becomes end-of-support or end-of-life (EOS & EOL).

Also keep in mind that vendors tend to stop upgrading firmware after 1-3 years from the release date. This is because they generally feel pretty confident and stable about the code as their bug reports slow down and die off. By the time you'd want to sign a contract with PARSEC, you'd probably be well out of this period. So, to be fair and compare apples to apples, the OEM vendor isn't going to give you firmware updates beyond a certain point either, even despite having the legal means to do so. 

===== What is a Kernel Patch? =====

The kernel is the core of most operating systems. It describes only the most
important and highly used parts of the OS. These parts are typically protected
within security contexts that make any vulnerability a severe one. 

The question arises, how can a third party company like PARSEC create a
kernel patch when we do not have access to the source code for the OS? The
answer is simple: we cannot. 

Having said that, consider the fact that most operating systems experience
kernel patches in the first year or two of their lifespans.  After that, the
bugs are typically found via normal usage and the everyday use of the OS for
intended purposes. 


==== PARSEC Patch Program ====

PARSEC has a product offering to address the issue of patching for version
locked customers.  We develop, test, and ship a completely separate patch
lifeline for each of the Unix operating systems we support.  Currently, we
have no option for OpenVMS.

These are absolutely positively not patches from the operating system
vendor.  Shipping or including the OS vendor's patches would be a huge
mistake for PARSEC as it's completely illegal and other companies have
crashed and burned for no other reason that passing along these vendor
patches.  These are patches that PARSEC consultants create specifically
based on known vulnerabilities. 

===== Selection of Patch Candidates =====

We select patches based on the OS specific entries in the CVE database. 
We'll also create specific stability patches where possible.  We also
specifically patch and update Secure Shell based on security revisions.

Secure Shell is definitely the big item to get updates for.  You can't have
people using that service for a denial-of-service attack or privilege
escalation.  Of course, looking at an operating system like Sun Solaris 8 or
HP Tru64, we see extremely old and vulnerable versions. So, PARSEC Patches
generally replace the entire subsystem, porting your host-keys over where
possible. However, rather than ending up with SunSSH (a crappy OpenSSH port)
you get real, honest-to-goodness OpenSSH from the 6.x or 7.x series which is
far past all the old serious Secure Shell hacks. 

Any CVE vulnerability published for the operating system that doesn't have a
vendor patch, we will patch.  We will also patch when there are issues with
OpenSSH or significant feature updates (OpenSSH 7.x has a lot of these most
people haven't had to contend with yet, since they are on older versions). 
Last, we'll patch when there are significant performance or stability issues
in subsystems we have code-access to, for example Sendmail or Inetd.
                                                                                                                                                           
===== What We Do NOT Patch and Why =====

PARSEC doesn't have the complete source code to most of the operating
systems we support.  Where we do have source code, we aren't allowed to use
it to compile new binaries. So, for things like firmware or deep kernel
patches, we cannot issue patches. Keep in mind these types of patches are
usually covered by the vendor before the end of the operating system support
happens. However, in cases were there is no other way to fix an issue other
than issuing a kernel patch, we can't attack the issue directly. 

Usually there is some other way to prevent exploitation of the attack.  For
example, in the AIX *lquerylv* exploit, we create a binary patch.  This way,
we never have to ship any IBM software.  We simply disable the feature which
is exploited.  This isn't as ideal as fixing the issue directly in the code,
of course.  However, keeping any eye on regulatory compliance, which is more
important some obscure feature few folks ever even used or were aware of, or
your companies positive regulatory compliance?  The fix, thus addresses the
needs of folks wanting to version-lock while staying compliant with their
own security policies.

When there are CVE's which we cannot address from any angle because, for
example, it'd require a deep kernel patch to fix, we will attempt a
workaround instead.  However, if there is no possible workaround we will
note this and notify any customer who is part of our program that we are not
able to address it and the implications of whatever the security issue
causes.  This allows for administrators and site security administrators to
make informed decisions and either implement a workaround if possible or
deprecate the server if needed.

===== What We Do Patch with Examples =====                                                                                                                                                         

Most of the time, OS vendors do not write basic system software if they
don't have to.  This is one of the major draws to Unix and was an especially
powerful attraction in the 1980's when writing your own Unix-like OS from
scratch was only for the very biggest corporations (IBM writing AIX from
scratch was a rare event).  Why re-write things like Inetd, Sendmail, or
Secure Shell?  They already exist in the world and most of the time all the
OS vendor does is simply to customize the software settings to their liking
and re-release the.  They want to be free to focus on parts they feel are
value-adds for their product, not on basic functionality that should already
be baked in.  This fact gives PARSEC the ability to get the original source
distribution for many such items and use them for the basis of a patch.

A good example is AIX 5.3.  The OS had twelve major updates or "technology
levels" as IBM calls them.  The official lifespan of the OS was two years.

Let's look at the actual track record.  During that two year period, we can
examine the history of security problems using a tool from cvedetails.com
showing the incidence of security problems for this OS. 
[[https://www.cvedetails.com/version/15934/IBM-AIX-5.3.html|CVEs for AIX]]

It takes some hand waving to explain the results.  You have to remember that
AIX 5.1 came out long before 5.3 and this is the reason why you see exploits
and issues going back before 5.3's release date.  They are rolling issues
into 5.3 that really were inherited from AIX 5.1.  We can see that the
majority of issues happened during the operational years of the OS.

It's also clear that some vulnerabilities surfaced long after IBM decided to
quit patching.  For example, there is an lquerylv command execution
vulnerability that emerged in 2015.  This is after the end-of-support date
for AIX 5.3 and guess what?  IBM didn't patch it and probably never will. 
When we examine the associated
[[https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IV67907|IBM APAR]] bug
issue.  PARSEC has a byte-patch available for the issue, but IBM only
shipped a new binary for AIX versions 6 & 7.

Bottom line is that if you were a PARSEC Patch customer, you could keep
using your AIX 5.3 system indefinitely and still be 100% above board for
your regulatory compliance and patching.

In the event of a remote root exploit or a remotely exploitable issue in
either OpenSSH or OpenSSL, we will release patches earlier.  This is
analogous to a hotfix process.  Any patches released off-cycle will be
rolled into that quarter's patch bundle.

===== Why We Use Enterprise Package Manager for Patches =====

The EPM tool is an open source package management system written by Michael
Sweet.  All package systems for Unix are basically the same.  I'm not saying
all of them are equal, I'm just saying they all do the same functions.  That
is that they either add, remove, track, or modify packages.  EPM is no
different.

I first ran into EPM while working at Oracle. They used it for out-of-band
package management of all the internal kruft Oracle likes to install on
their hosted server systems. It worked quite well for them. 

The EPM packages allow us to use pre-install, post-install, pre-remove, and
post-remove package scripts. It also allows us to individually bundle
packages or setup dependency trees. So, it's a very fully featured package
management tool.

One might ask, why not just use the native tools that the OS vendor packages
with the operating system itself?  Well, that's fair.  Most of those tools
are usable and releasing vendor-native packages does have some appeal. 
However, we reasoned that using EPM was actually better because it doesn't
alter the local package registry at all.  It exists out-of-band with it and
stays completely independent. The main situation to consider here is if a
vendor decided to release a patch for something they previously said they
wouldn't touch. In that situation, we can easily back out our patch and
install the vendor version. Keep in mind that'd be an extremely rare
situation that we haven't yet seen, though. 

Ultimately, it's just easier to keep the system's package registry pristine
and allow EPM packages to keep their own package registry separately. This
is done actually quite simply in EPM. There is a directory called
/etc/software which contains a removal script for every installed package.

If a customer specifically requests a patch be in native format, we can easily create that, also. 

=== Patching and Regulatory Compliance ===

Let's face it, many times patching is driven by the need to comply with some
type of regulatory standard.  These standards often regulate when patches
are installed, what procedures must be taken before and after, and what type
of patches are required.  However, in other cases, the standards are vague
and complex.  Lawyers seem to be able to generate much more difficult code
to parse than programmers.

However, in most cases one simply needs to have a plan for patching and technology updates. If your plan is to [[version lock|version_locking_legacy_environments]], then 

===== How Do I Know What I'm Required to Patch? =====

In almost all cases, the regulatory standards try to be broad and use a lot
of catch all language that empowers the auditor.  Most standards are most
insistent that you exercise "controls" (policies and procedures) to deal
with IT security.  They basically allow you to construct your own "cage" and
live in it.  The biggest mistake most companies make is that they create
very strict standards (well, the security team does) and they document those
standards.  However, after that they take no action to actually enable and
enforce the standards.  When the auditor shows up, they find that the
company has not been practicing any of it's supposed standards. The company
would have been better off establishing a lower bar they could actually
reach. 

Of course, that is not to say that the various regulatory standards have no
floor on what they will allow you to put into policy and practice.  Most
have very vague requirements that can cause a lot of discussion and
controversy as to if *your* policy is meeting the spirit and letter of the
governance. So, in order to further clarify, allow me to illuminate some of
the common standards and what they actually require in further sections. 

===== When am I Required to Patch? =====

Patching frequency is almost always dependent on what your local security
policy requires.  If you become a PARSEC Patch customer, you should make
sure your policy doesn't require patching your legacy systems at greater
than quarterly frequency (with exceptions for hot fixes).  Otherwise, you
could easily get out of compliance with your own policy.  This is one easy
way auditors will ding you.  So, make sure to work with your own compliance
folks to document what you really do instead of what you think you should
do.  Otherwise, the auditors may find that the two don't overlap well
enough.

==== GLBA Specifics ====

U.S.  Congress gave us the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also called the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.  This is a law intended to
govern (among other things) the release of sensitive financial information. 
The law limits when a financial institution can disclose a customer's
personal information known as "NPI" (non-public personal information).

The real meat of the GLBA text is called
[[https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/6801|The Safeguards Rule]] and
this is where IT folks should concentrate.

You can read the text easily (it's not too terrible legalese). However, let
me summarize it.

**GLBA IT Requirements**
  - You must secure customer's NPI data keeping it private and confidential.
  - You must protect the data against any anticipated threats.
  - You must act to prevent harm or inconvenience to the customer due to disclosed NPI info. 

As you can see these are pretty broad requirements.  However, we know that
security threats of any consequence are given a CVE entry.  If new threats
emerge and we choose not to address them, then we are out of compliance with
the GLBA, pure and simple.  From this perspective, the GLBA requires you to
apply patches and to maintain the ring-fence around the customer NPI data.

Encryption usually plays a big role in GLBA security controls.  Thus, you
are going to need to be free of things like the SSL Heartbleed problem
disclosed in 2014.  Anything that could be used to compromise your
encryption's operational security must be fixed and updated.

==== HIPPA Specifics ====

The requirements in HIPPA are designed to protect individuals from
information disclosure happening at the institutional level by folks like
hospitals and insurance companies ("payers and providers" to use the
industry term). 

Anyone who handles Protected Health Information (PHI) is probably already
governed by HIPPA.  However, what does that mean for IT professionals who
manage servers in the healthcare industry?  Well, the part of HIPPA we need
to pay all the attention to in that case is called
[[https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html|The Security Rule]]. 
It is very similar to the GLBA requirements.

What The Security Rule says is actually pretty complex.  However, the spirit
of the law is that you must do everything reasonable to prevent PHI
disclosure and you must maintain a clean IT infrastructure free from
known-problems. The actual way it breaks down these requirements is into
essentially three categories: physical safeguards, administrative safeguards,
and technical safeguards. Physical safeguards are things like locks (and
their proper use). Administrative safeguards maps pretty nicely to the
phrase "need to know". 

Technical safeguards are the IT stuff you and I care about. The text of
HIPPA doesn't say **exactly** what kind of solutions you have to implement,
but it does say what those solutions have to be capable of from a security
standpoint.

**HIPPA IT Requirements in the Security Rule**
  - Open networks need to be encrypted. Closed networks are okay for cleartext. 
  - Data integrity for PHI must be insured. Think checksumming.
  - Access to PHI must be authenticated.
  - You must share your IT documentation available concerning HIPPA security.
  - You must document your configuration when PHI is involved.
  - Risk analysis and risk management programs are required for HIPPA entities. This is the big one. This basically says "you have to patch known issues."

As you can see, HIPPA is vague but only in ways that advantage the auditors.

===== SOX Specifics =====

Sarbanes-Oxley is a law which is part of the US Title 15 code governing
financial disclosures. It's a complex law, but in a nutshell it tries to make
sure that the information that investors and the US Security and Exchange
Commission is accurate, free from tampering/fraud, and keeps the folks doing
the disclosing on the hook for the accuracy of the information. The idea is
that this prevents crooked companies from lying about their profit and loss
to scam their clients or investors. 

SOX is extremely vague and this creates headaches. The law to read is, US Title
15, Chapter 98, Subchapter IV (ugh, I feel like a laywer). [[https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/chapter-98/subchapter-IV|This]]
has a section called [[https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/7266|Enhanced review of periodic disclosures by issuers]] and this
is the part you want to read concerning IT rules. Unfortunately, their
requirements are much more vague. However, again, I will provide a summary.

**Sarbanes-Oxley IT 404 Requirements**
  - "Internal controls must be assessed for effectiveness" 
  - The assessment must be done yearly and it must be reported to the SEC

It's a painful read and I'd recommend checking out the
[[https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/legal/overview-sarbanes-oxley-information-security-professional-1426|SOX For IT Pros]] guide by SANS.  It will help you decode the requirements for
SOX.  Do they require patches?  Well yes of course, otherwise an insecure
system could not be considered a secure source of financial information. 
It's easily falsifiable if it's on an insecure computer.  However, this is
all mostly extrapolation because the text of the law itself doesn't require
anything really specific from your IT security.

===== PCI Specifics =====

The Payment Card Industry (PCI) standards aren't law, they are well accepted
standards used by credit card companies to govern their merchants and
customers.  In other words, if your company processes credit cards, you're
going to be subject to PCI standards or risk losing your merchant status.

PCI standards are actually very detailed but there are different "levels" of
compliance needed for different folks.  It all basically comes down to how
many credit cards you process on a regular basis.

PCI can get pretty complex and specific. However, all levels of PCI have the
same basic spirit. You can't do anything that might put folks credit card
info at risk. That includes not only their numbers, but also their
transaction history. Start with the [[https://www.pcicomplianceguide.org/faq|FAQ]]
and you can dig more into specific questions for different levels of PCI. 

Without going into the *many* specific requirements of the PCI standard,
let's get a few things straight. Any system that's going to store or process
credit card info has to be kept secure. Keeping it secure means patching,
having a security policy, proving you execute on a regular basis, etc.. 

PCI standards also get very specific about the usage of encryption.  Since
many security problems impact SSL, SSH, or other encryption tools and
protocols the code-path in those tools must be kept secure.

=== Examples and Demonstrations ===

Just for fun, let's watch a few PARSEC patches in action and have a quick
discussion about the actual mechanics of applying the patches.  There is
only so much legalese and policy discussions one can have before wanting to
see something more concrete.

==== Upgrading Secure Shell ====

Here is an example on a Tru64 system. We have an ancient and highly
customized version of Secure Shell which is now a dead branch of SSH. We
need to get the system upgraded to a more modern version of Secure Shell.
PARSEC has a package which will do this automatically. 

EPM packages can be put into native system format (setld format is the
package format in Tru64) or they can be setup as "native" or "portable"
packages.  This is the preference we'll use to keep from polluting the local
package repo.  In cases where the customer requests native packages, we can
easily provide them as EPM will generate multiple package formats from the
same metadata definition file.  The "portable" format just generates an
installable shell archive: very handy.

**Upgrading Secure Shell on Tru64**
<code>
$ sudo ./openssh.install 
Copyright 1999-2017 by Michael R Sweet, All Rights Reserved.

This installation script will install the OpenBSD Secure Shell 
software version 7.9 on your system.

Do you wish to continue? yes

 Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993
	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.

 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 are met:
 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
    must display the following acknowledgement:
	This product includes software developed by the University of
	California, Berkeley and its contributors.
 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
    without specific prior written permission.

 THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 SUCH DAMAGE.
[...]

Do you agree with the terms of this license? yes
Backing up old versions of shared files to be installed...
Installing software...
INFO: Running Tru64 OpenSSH upgrade procedure, preserving host keys where
possible. 
WARNING: Host keys may have changed. Please update any clients. 
Updating file permissions...
Installation is complete.
</code>

As you can see, this is a somewhat interactive process.  You can simply add
the word "now" to the command line and this will bypass the interactive
agreement and just do the installation quietly.

==== Upgrading Sendmail ====

Sendmail is another bit of software which comes from the open source world,
but just about all vendors have packaged at some point or another. Problems
with Sendmail are going to be patchable because the software comes from
folks who share the code. So, we will not provide the vendor specific
version or any fixes from the vendor, but we will provide the open source
version and fixes from the project. The latter is almost always going to be
newer and better at addressing security concerns. The vendors typically
don't update until something forces them to. 

**Upgrading Sendmail**
<code>
$ cd epm/tru64-5.1-alpha
$ sudo ./sendmail.install 
Copyright 1999-2017 by Michael R Sweet, All Rights Reserved.

This installation script will install the Sendmail software version 8.15.2 on
your system.

Do you wish to continue? yes

     SENDMAIL LICENSE
The following license terms and conditions apply, unless a redistribution
agreement or other license is obtained from Proofpoint, Inc., 892
Ross Street, Sunnyvale, CA, 94089, USA, or by electronic mail at
sendmail-license@proofpoint.com.
License Terms:
Use, Modification and Redistribution (including distribution of any
modified or derived work) in source and binary forms is permitted only if
each of the following conditions is met:
1. Redistributions qualify as "freeware" or "Open Source Software" under
   one of the following terms:
   (a) Redistributions are made at no charge beyond the reasonable cost of
       materials and delivery.
   (b) Redistributions are accompanied by a copy of the Source Code or by an
       irrevocable offer to provide a copy of the Source Code for up to three
       years at the cost of materials and delivery.  Such redistributions
       must allow further use, modification, and redistribution of the Source
       Code under substantially the same terms as this license.  For the
       purposes of redistribution "Source Code" means the complete compilable
       and linkable source code of sendmail and associated libraries and
       utilities in the sendmail distribution including all modifications.
2. Redistributions of Source Code must retain the copyright notices as they
   appear in each Source Code file, these license terms, and the
   disclaimer/limitation of liability set forth as paragraph 6 below.
3. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the Copyright Notice,
   these license terms, and the disclaimer/limitation of liability set
   forth as paragraph 6 below, in the documentation and/or other materials
   provided with the distribution.  For the purposes of binary distribution
   the "Copyright Notice" refers to the following language:
   "Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Proofpoint, Inc.  All rights reserved."
4. Neither the name of Proofpoint, Inc. nor the University of California nor
   names of their contributors may be used to endorse or promote
   products derived from this software without specific prior written
   permission.  The name "sendmail" is a trademark of Proofpoint, Inc.
5. All redistributions must comply with the conditions imposed by the
   University of California on certain embedded code, which copyright
   Notice and conditions for redistribution are as follows:
   (a) Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 The Regents of the University of
       California.  All rights reserved.
   (b) Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
       modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
       are met:
      (i)   Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
            notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
      (ii)  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
            copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
            disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
            with the distribution.
      (iii) Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
            contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
            from this software without specific prior written permission.
6. Disclaimer/Limitation of Liability: THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY
   SENDMAIL, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN
   NO EVENT SHALL SENDMAIL, INC., THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
   CALIFORNIA OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
   INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
   NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF
   USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON
   ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
   THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

Do you agree with the terms of this license? yes
Backing up old versions of shared files to be installed...
INFO: Stopping legacy sendmail instance before install
Installing software...
INFO: Starting new sendmail instance, succeeded.
Updating file permissions...
Installation is complete.
</code>

So, this is a MAJOR upgrade for Tru64 since it takes the mail server up two
major revisions and dozens of minor ones.  Since it's a big source of
exploits and trouble, upgrading Sendmail on a live system is a must if it
has to face the Internet.

==== Other Scenarios ====

Keep in mind that there is a heckuva lot more software that can be patched
and updated on just about all Unix variants. Also, almost all the services
that one might be required to run locally like Secure Shell, SMTP, Inetd,
and other network services are things the vendor got from the open source
world. Those are also the big risk as far as an attack surface. Fix those,
and you can maintain your system for a very long time, if not forever. 

There is also one huge advantage for version-lockers that we haven't
discussed.  Since most of the exploits and issues are found when a OS is in
it's mainstream lifespan, few issues pop up after the OS goes end-of-life. 
Sure, a showstopper issue can put you in a really bad spot, but not if you
have PARSEC backing you up and creating patches for those issues.  However,
once the OS becomes "old" fewer attackers spend time trying to hack it.  It
also means the software gets a lot of testing by users before the end of
service life.  Thus, fewer issues come up over time.  This means fewer patch
cycles and less hassle.